Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Volume 50

Number 2

Article 4

2017

Making Room for Juvenile Justice: The Supreme Court's Decision
in Montgomery v. Louisiana
Chelsea S. Gumaer
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Chelsea S. Gumaer, Making Room for Juvenile Justice: The Supreme Court's Decision in Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 50 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 257 (2017).

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School.
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

Making Room for Juvenile Justice: The Supreme Court's Decision in Montgomery
v. Louisiana
Cover Page Footnote
J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. English Language and Literature, General,
2014, Loyola Marymount University. My sincerest gratitude goes to Professor Aaron Caplan for his
indispensable guidence and editorial feedback and, to the entire editorial staff of the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review. Thank you to my family, my parents, brothers, and boyfriend for their unconditional
love, patience, and unwavering support.

This comments is available in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol50/iss2/4

50.2_GUMAER_V.9.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

9/11/18 9:08 PM

MAKING ROOM FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE
SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN
MONTGOMERY V. LOUISIANA
Chelsea S. Gumaer*
I. INTRODUCTION
Brendan Dassey, the child star of Netflix’s documentary series
“Making a Murderer,” was convicted for assisting his uncle in
murdering Teresa Halbach.1 Reasoning that Dassey’s youth, his
unfamiliarity in dealing with the police, and his low IQ made him
particularly susceptible to the coercive tactics employed by those
interrogating him, the judge overturned his conviction on August 12,
2016—nearly a decade after the 16-year-old boy was convicted.2 This
headline case highlights the Supreme Court’s recent reevaluation of
juveniles in the eyes of the criminal justice system, a trend made
especially clear in the 2016 case of Montgomery v. Louisiana.3
In Montgomery, the Court heard the challenge of a 65-year-old
man who was sentenced to life in prison without parole for a crime he
committed at the age of seventeen.4 The Court held that the rule laid
out in its earlier decision of Miller v. Alabama,5 that the Eighth
Amendment precluded mandatory sentences of life in prison without
the possibility of parole,6 could be applied retroactively to juveniles
that were sentenced years—even decades—before Miller was
decided.7 In doing so, the Court not only recognized the psychological
* J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. English Language and
Literature, General, 2014, Loyola Marymount University. My sincerest gratitude goes to Professor
Aaron Caplan for his indispensable guidence and editorial feedback and, to the entire editorial staff
of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. Thank you to my family, my parents, brothers, and
boyfriend for their unconditional love, patience, and unwavering support.
1. E.g. Dassey v. Dittmann, No. 14-CV-1310, 2016 WL 4257386, at *17, *35 (E.D. Wis.
Aug. 12, 2016).
2. Id.
3. 136 S. Ct. 718, 725 (2016).
4. Id. at 725-26.
5. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
6. Id. at 2460.
7. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
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and legal differences between juveniles and adults, adhering to the
same reasoning used by the Miller court, but went on to seemingly
expand the scope of habeas corpus relief available to prisoners who
were convicted, and whose collateral appeals were denied, under state
law.8 It is this latter point that was the main area of contention between
the majority and the dissenting justices, who favored finality9 and
federalism10 over retroactivity. To this point, the majority reasoned
that its authority to decide the case, and the petitioner’s ability to take
advantage of the Miller rule nearly fifty years after his indictment, was
clearly established by the constitutional undertones of Teague v.
Lane,11 a case which limited retroactive application of new rules in the
context of federal habeas corpus relief.12
This Comment explores Montgomery and argues that the majority
was correct in holding that collateral courts must apply new
substantive rules of constitutional law retroactively, and that the rule
laid out in Miller is one such rule. Part II establishes the historical
background upon which the majority’s decision rests, focusing on the
previously narrow exceptions to habeas relief laid out in Teague and
briefly outlining the Court’s decision in Miller. Part III details what
happened in Montgomery’s case. Part IV describes the Court’s
justification for reviewing a state court’s collateral proceedings, as
well as the Court’s ability to impose the Miller rule retroactively.
Finally, Part V analyzes what this case says about the Court’s stance
on habeas corpus relief, arguing that this may be the Court’s attempt
to reposition itself as a more habeas-friendly forum.
II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Habeas Corpus Relief
Habeas corpus relief is the result of a collateral attack13 brought
by a convicted prisoner whose sentence has already been made final.14
Established originally as a common law writ, habeas relief has been
8. Id. at 728.
9. See id. at 739 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10. See id. at 745 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
11. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
12. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
13. 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 171 (2016) (“A proceeding in habeas corpus which attacks the
judgment or sentence of a criminal trial is, with respect to this judgment or sentence, a collateral
attack.”).
14. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S 667, 682–83 (1971)).
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federally codified,15 as well as recognized by states in their own
collateral proceedings.16 Originally, federal habeas courts reviewed
state court convictions with fresh eyes, determining whether the state
court was correct in its analysis of the defendant’s case.17 However,
federal courts quickly changed course following the Supreme Court
decision of Teague v. Lane and the enactment of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter the “AEDPA”),18
which placed “a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court
to grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus,” by
limiting the scope of the federal court’s power to review the state
court’s decision.19 In Teague, the Court addressed whether it was
required to apply new rules of law retroactively to cases pending on
collateral review at the time the new rules were announced.20 The
Court held that, generally, a new constitutional rule does not apply
retroactively to convictions that were final at the time the new rule was
announced.21 However, Teague explained that courts must “give
retroactive effect to new substantive rules of constitutional law,”22 as
well as procedural rules that implicate the fairness and accuracy of the
prisoner’s trial process.23 It was against this backdrop that the
Montgomery Court made its decision.
B. The Miller Decision
Like Montgomery, the Miller case, too, involved petitions for
habeas relief by defendants sentenced as juveniles. Unlike
Montgomery, however, the Miller Court created a new substantive rule
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012).
16. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473 (West 2015); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.01
(West 2015); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 882, 926 (2008).
17. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463 (1953) (reasoning that federal judges must
determine if a “satisfactory conclusion has been reached” under the record viewed by the state
court).
18. Pub. L. No. 104–132.
19. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411–13 (2000) (“[A] federal habeas court may not issue
the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that
application must also be unreasonable.”).
20. Teague, 489 U.S. at 295–96.
21. Id.
22. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 728 (2016) (citing Teague, 489 U.S. 288).
Unlike procedural rules, which govern the manner in which a defendant could be found guilty for
their illegal conduct, substantive rules are those that interpret the Constitution and may prohibit a
state from punishing a certain type of conduct altogether. Id.
23. Teague, 489 U.S. at 295.
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of law, instead of attempting to retroactively apply a new rule of law.
The Miller decision came after two other Supreme Court decisions
aimed at reducing the severity of juvenile sentencing. First, in Roper
v. Simmons, the Court held that juveniles could not be sentenced to
death.24 Next, in Graham v. Florida, the Court held that life in prison
without parole (hereinafter “LWOP”) was an unconstitutional
sentence for juvenile non-homicide offenders.25 These cases left open
the question to be decided by the Court in Miller: whether a juvenile
could be sentenced to LWOP under a mandatory sentencing scheme.
Miller consolidated the habeas proceedings of two boys who were
sentenced to LWOP pursuant to their respective states’ mandatory
sentencing schemes.26 The defendants in Miller argued that a
mandatory sentence of LWOP violated the Eight Amendment when
applied to 14-year-old children.27 The majority agreed, reasoning that
mandatory schemes prevent sentencing courts from considering a
defendant’s youth and corresponding attributes, and by doing so,
automatically impose the harshest punishment available.28 To
emphasize this point, the Court analogized LWOP for a child offender
to that of the death penalty for an adult.29 However, unlike children
sentenced to LWOP, adults sentenced under the death penalty receive
individualized sentencing that provides them an opportunity to present
mitigating factors.30
The Court concluded that mandatory sentencing schemes for
juveniles “pose too great a risk for disproportionate punishment.”31 It
reasoned that “[m]andatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes
consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—
among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks
and consequences.”32 Although stating that it was not imposing a
categorical bar on LWOP for juvenile offenders, it held that this

24. 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
25. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
26. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2462–63 (2012).
27. See id.
28. Id. at 2466.
29. Id.
30. The Miller court borrowed the reasoning of the court in Graham. Id. at 2467 (citing
Graham, 560 U.S. at 89-90).
31. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
32. Id. at 2468.
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sentence could not—and would not—be applied, except in the rarest
of cases.33
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At the age of seventeen, Henry Montgomery murdered deputy
sheriff Charles Hurt, in East Baton Rouge, Louisiana.34 On February
6, 1969, a jury convicted Montgomery of murder without capital
punishment, triggering an automatic sentence of LWOP as required by
Louisiana law.35 On June 25, 2012, almost 50 years after Montgomery
was sentenced, the Supreme Court held that mandatory sentences of
LWOP violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and
unusual punishments,” when the accused was under the age of
eighteen at the time he or she committed the crime.36 This new rule
formed the basis of the argument underlying Montgomery’s motion to
correct an illegal sentence, which he filed in Louisiana state court.37
Under Louisiana law, prisoners may challenge their sentences
collaterally by filing a motion to correct an illegal sentence in the state
trial court where the prisoner was convicted and sentenced. 38 These
state collateral review courts hear claims challenging already-final
convictions that were recently deemed unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment by the United States Supreme Court.39
Montgomery did just that, arguing that Miller decreed his mandatory
sentence illegal.40
The East Baton Rouge Parish District Court denied
Montgomery’s motion, ruling that Miller does not apply retroactively

33. Id. at 2469.
34. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 725 (2016).
35. Id. at 725–726. Montgomery was originally convicted of murder and sentenced to death;
however, this conviction was reversed, and a new trial required, after the Louisiana Supreme Court
found that public prejudice caused an unfair trial. See State v. Montgomery, 47895 (La. 01/17/66);
181 So. 2d 756.
36. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
37. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 726–27.
38. Id. at 726; LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 882 (2008).
39. For example, in State v. Shaffer, the Louisiana Supreme Court deleted the portion of a
prisoner’s sentence that did not afford him the opportunity for parole in order to follow the United
States Supreme Court’s constitutional mandate that mandatory life without parole convictions are
unconstitutional for non-homicidal juvenile convicts. State v. Shaffer, 2011-1756 (La. 11/23/11);
77 So. 3d 939, 942–43 (2011) (applying the rule given by Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74
(2010), to a prisoner’s already final conviction of life in prison without parole); see Montgomery,
136 S. Ct. at 726–27.
40. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 727.
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on state collateral review.41 The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed,
affirming the trial court’s determination that Miller does not apply to
a state court’s collateral review because Miller simply announced a
procedural rule of law.42 Montgomery then filed a writ for certiorari,
asking the United States Supreme Court to address whether Miller
announced a substantive rule of law that applies retroactively to a state
court’s collateral review proceeding, which would render his
mandatory sentence of LWOP illegal.43
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S REASONING
A. The Majority Opinion: Jurisdiction
Two issues had to be addressed by the Court in Montgomery.
First, because Montgomery’s collateral challenge was decided
pursuant to Louisiana’s state law defining collateral proceedings, did
the Court have jurisdiction to decide whether the Louisiana state court
erred in refusing to apply a new rule of constitutional law
retroactively?44 Second, assuming the Court did have jurisdiction to
rule on the state court decision, is Miller’s prohibition on mandatory
life in prison without parole for juvenile offenders a substantive rule
that must be applied retroactively?45
Justice Kennedy, writing for a five-justice majority, answered
both questions in the affirmative.46 In answering the first question, the
majority looked to the rule laid out in Teague.47 The majority’s
reasoning hinged on the first exception to Teague’s general rule
precluding retroactive application, holding that “when a new
substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case,
the Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give
retroactive effect to that rule.”48 In so holding, the majority rejected
the argument that Teague’s rule does not apply to a state collateral
41. Id.
42. The Louisiana Supreme court relied on its previous decision in State v. Tate, 12–2763 (La.
11/5/13); 130 So.3d 829, which held that Miller did not apply retroactively because it laid out a
procedural rule of law which, under Teague, could not be applied retroactively in a collateral review
proceeding. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 727.
43. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 727.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 732, 736.
47. See supra Section II(A).
48. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729.
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review proceeding brought under state statute because Teague ruled
on a challenge to a proceeding in federal court brought under a federal
statute.49 Instead, the majority found that Teague left unanswered
whether its two exceptions are binding on the states.50 The Court
articulated that because the Constitution mandates that substantive
rules of law have retroactive effect, these substantive rules are binding
on state courts regardless of what type of proceeding the rules are
presented in.51 In other words, even when a state court is applying its
state’s law governing collateral proceedings, that state court is bound
by the Supreme Court’s new substantive rules of constitutional law.52
The majority explained that these substantive constitutional rules
protect a prisoner from being penalized for conduct that is now
“constitutionally immune from punishment.”53 Simply put, “a
conviction under an unconstitutional law is not merely erroneous, but
is illegal and void, and cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment.”54
Because of this, “a court has no authority to leave in place a conviction
or sentence that violates a substantive rule, regardless of whether the
conviction or sentence became final before the rule was announced.”55
Following this analysis, the next question the Court had to address
seemed relatively simple.
B. Miller Announced a Substantive Rule of Law that Requires
Retroactive Application.
After establishing that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to
determine whether substantive rules interpreting the Constitution
could be applied retroactively in state collateral proceeding, the Court
next had to decide if the rule articulated in Miller qualified as
49. Id. at 728-29.
50. Id. at 729.
51. The Court reasoned that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution affords state courts no
greater power than federal habeas courts to force a prisoner to remain incarcerated under a law that
is unconstitutional. Id. at 729, 731–32. It further opined that if state courts allow claims controlled
by federal law to be brought by prisoners in their state collateral proceedings, then the state courts
must apply the substantive constitutional rules that govern the outcome of the issues raised. Id.
52. The majority reasoned that there are substantive rules that “set forth categorical
constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punishments altogether beyond the
State’s power to impose. It follows that when a State enforces a . . . penalty barred by the
Constitution, the resulting conviction or sentence is, by definition, unlawful.” Id. at 729-30.
53. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 730 (quoting United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S.
715, 724 (1971)).
54. Id. at 724 (quoting Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1879)).
55. Id.
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sufficiently substantive. The Court repeated that a substantive rule of
law is one that both forbids punishment of certain conduct, and one
that prohibits a certain category of punishment for a group of
defendants based on their status or offense.56 Thus, substantive rules
of law protect against disproportionate punishments that violate the
Eighth Amendment.57 The rule announced by Miller, the Court
reasoned, did just that: it deemed a sentence of LWOP an
unconstitutional sentence for all but the rarest juvenile offenders.58
Finding that Miller’s prohibition on this punishment for juveniles
was a substantive rule of law, the Court acknowledged that there are
procedural components inherent in the Miller decision,59 but that these
procedural requirements do not undermine the substantive heart of the
decision, that “children are constitutionally different from adults for
purposes of sentencing.”60 Granting prisoners convicted as juveniles a
hearing where their age and attendant characteristics are considered
only gives effect to the substantive rule of constitutional law
proscribed in Miller: “that life without parole is an excessive sentence
for children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.”61 In
conclusion, the majority found Miller is a substantive rule of
constitutional law that, under Teague, must be applied retroactively to
convictions challenged collaterally.62
C. The Dissenting Opinions
Both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas took issue with the
majority’s discussion of the Court’s jurisdiction to decide the case.
Justice Scalia pointed out that the cases cited by the majority for the
proposition that new constitutional rules must be applied retroactively
dealt with issues pending on direct review. 63 He reasoned that
collateral review cases are “fundamentally different” than cases
pending on direct review because collateral proceedings, by their
56. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989))
(internal quotations and punctuation omitted).
57. Id. at 732–33.
58. Id. at 734. The Court acknowledged that the one exception in the Miller rule for the
juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption, did not eliminate the fact that Miller
mandated that LWOP was an excessive punishment for the class of all other juvenile offenders.
59. Id. at 734-35.
60. Id. at 733 (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464).
61. Id. at 735.
62. Id. at 736.
63. Id. at 738 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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nature, disrupt finality.64 Moreover, Justice Scalia reasoned that
Teague’s general rule of prohibiting retroactive application of new
rules in collateral proceedings, and even its limited exceptions, were
not based on the Constitution.65 Specifically, Justice Scalia questioned
the majority’s reliance on the Supremacy Clause.66 He argued that the
Supremacy Clause did not give the majority jurisdiction to decide the
case, but instead lead to another question: which federal law is
supreme. Looking at the precedent relied on by the majority, Scalia
found that the “supreme” law requires federal courts to “review statecourt decisions against the law and factual record that existed at the
time the decisions were made.”67 Thus, if federal habeas courts must
follow “old rules” existing at the time of the state court conviction,
Scalia found no justification in the Supremacy Clause allowing the
“new” Miller rule to apply to a state court conviction and subsequent
denial of habeas relief.68
Even assuming there was jurisdiction to decide the case, Justice
Scalia concluded that Miller did not espouse a substantive rule, but
instead proscribed a new procedure by requiring a sentencing court to
“follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and
attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.”69
Thus, in Justice Scalia’s opinion, not only was the majority incorrect
in its classification of the Miller rule, but the Court should not have
even touched the case in the first place.70
Justice Thomas agreed, but wrote separately to highlight the lack
of authority in the Constitution’s text, or its history, for the majority’s
jurisdiction.71 Absent from the Supremacy Clause,72 Article III,73 the
64. Id. at 739.
65. Id. at 738-39. Instead, Justice Scalia notes the majority in Teague understood the
disruption that collateral proceedings had on finality, and in no way discussed constitutional issues.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 738-39. Naturally, Justice Scalia reasoned that “[a]ny relief a prisoner
might receive in a state court after finality is a matter of grace, not constitutional prescription.” Id.
66. See supra note 51.
67. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 738-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Greene v. Fisher, 132 S.
Ct. 38, 43–44 (2011)).
68. Id. at 741.
69. Id. (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471) (emphasis omitted).
70. Id. at 744.
71. Id. at 745 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
72. Justice Thomas reasoned that the Supremacy Clause mandates that if there is a federal
constitutional right in existence, then that right trumps any contrary rule of state law. It does not
allow for the creation of substantive rights that will thereafter supersede state law. Id.
73. Likewise, Article III of the Constitution defines the scope of federal judges’ power, and
therefore cannot implicate the decisions of state post-conviction courts. Id. at 745-46.
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Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,74 and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the right
to void an unconstitutional sentence that has already been finalized.
Without a constitutional basis for the majority’s new rule of
retroactivity,75 Justice Thomas opined that the majority lacked
jurisdiction to impose the Miller rule on the state’s collateral
decision.76
PART V: MAKING HABEAS RELIEF ACCESSIBLE
The AEDPA has been viewed as an almost insurmountable hurdle
for prisoners convicted in state courts to overcome. Lower courts’
hands are tied in the face of Supreme Court precedent.77 The AEDPA
changed the deferential scheme laid out in Brown v. Allen.78 Instead,
the AEDPA allows a federal court to step in where the state court’s
adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court” or resulted in an unreasonable
determination of the facts that were presented in the state court
proceeding.79 This unreasonable standard allows state court
convictions to be overturned,80 as a federal habeas court cannot

74. The Due Process Clause, similarly, applied to governmental actions violating the law of
the land at the time of those governmental actions. Moreover, Justice Thomas reasoned that, even
if due process anticipated new substantive rules, it does not require courts to “revisit settled
convictions or sentences on collateral review.” Id.
75. Justice Thomas further reasoned that the history of both state and federal post-conviction
proceedings does not support the majority’s rule of retroactivity. Id. at 747-48.
76. Id. at 744-45.
77. In his critique of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the AEDPA, Judge Reinhardt of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals states that these restrictive interpretations of the statute are
justified by the Court on the basis that “[f]ederal habeas review of state convictions frustrates both
the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their good faith attempts to honor constitutional
rights and intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree matched by few exercises of federal judicial
authority.” Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified
Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of
Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219,
1229-30 (2015) (internal citations and punctuation omitted).
78. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). Following this decision, federal habeas courts were not bound by the
state court determinations, even if the issues raised in the state court proceedings mirrored those
made in the federal habeas proceeding. See Charles Doyle, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Brief Legal
Overview, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. FOR CONGRESS 8, 14 (Apr. 26, 2006),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33391.pdf.
79. 22 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2016).
80. See Reinhardt, supra note 77, at 1241-42. Judge Reinhardt noted fifteen cases in which
the Supreme Court granted review of habeas cases in order to reverse the appellate decisions that
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overturn even a clearly erroneous state court decision.81 In fact, many
recent Supreme Court cases illustrate the court’s apprehension in
overturning a state court’s denial of habeas relief,82 reasoning that
finality and confidence in a state court’s judgment must be given great
weight.83
The Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery illustrates a
departure from this restrictive framework. By giving petitioners who
were sentenced as juveniles the ability to apply for relief under a new
substantive rule of law retroactively, the Court provides a more
navigable path for prisoners to obtain habeas relief.84 In doing so, the
majority’s opinion gives credence to the underlying premise of the
great writ of habeas corpus: to safeguard against unjust detainment and
protect individual liberty.85 Moreover, the majority recognizes the
multitude of definitions of finality. Finality can be achieved by the
knowledge that a defendant has been rehabilitated, that he or she has
“learned a lesson.”86 Finality is the knowledge that the person behind

granted habeas relief and thereby did not grant sufficient deference to the state court judgments.
See id.
81. See Reinhardt, supra note77, at 1225. Judge Reinhardt attempted to analyze Justice
O’Connor’s opinion in Harrington v. Ritcher, which stated that the AEDPA gave federal courts
habeas authority only where there is “no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state
court’s decision conflicts with the Supreme Court’s precedents.” Id. at 1228 (quoting Harrington
v. Ritcher, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786–87 (2011)) (emphasis omitted). He opined that this effectively
prohibits a federal habeas court from ever granting habeas relief, because to do so appellate judges
“would need to find that each of the state court judges who denied the petitioner’s claim was not
fairminded.” See id. at 1229.
82. See Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015) (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s grant of habeas
relief); see also Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1792 (2013) (rejecting petitioner’s claim for
habeas relief even while admitting that his constitutional due process rights may have been
violated).
83. Reinhardt, supra note 77, at 1230. Judge Reinhardt suggests that the Supreme Court
ignores the practical effects of giving too much discretion to state courts, who not only have judges
that must be reelected each year and therefore have political stances to illustrate, but also have very
heavy caseloads and therefore cannot meticulously address each federal habeas claim. Id. at
1231-32.
84. See Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Further Limit on Life Sentences for Youthful
Criminals, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 25, 2016, 12:26 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/
opinion-analysis-further-limit-on-life-sentences-for-youthful-criminals.
85. Robert Perkinson, The Gutted Writ: On Habeas Corpus, THE NATION (Dec. 22, 2010)
https://www.thenation.com/article/gutted-writ-habeas-corpus.
86. Jeanne Bishop, A Victims’ Family Member on Juvenile Life Without Parole Sentences:
“Brutal Finality” and Unfinished Souls, 9 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 85, 88 (2016). Bishop, in
reviewing the judicial scheme regarding LWOP sentences for juveniles before Miller, notes another
definition of finality which “comes when an offender is rehabilitated and no longer a threat, when
a sentence is served and over and the offender is set free. There are no more court dates or hearings,
no more wrangling in legal proceedings. The case is done[.]” Id. at 88.
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bars was fairly incarcerated based on the numerous chances she had to
defend herself in our judicial system, including by the use of the great
writ. Lastly, by requiring all courts to apply new substantive rules of
constitutional law, the majority implicitly recognizes the fundamental
unfairness of keeping someone sentenced under a law that he or she
could not be sentenced under if their case was decided today.
PART VI: CONCLUSION
By hearing an appeal following a state denial of habeas relief, the
decision shows the Court’s willingness to provide channels for
prisoners convicted in state court to access federal habeas relief.87
According to the majority opinion, it seems as though any prisoner
who pursues state habeas relief in reliance on new federal laws will
benefit.88 On the other hand, perhaps the Court is only attempting to
grant more relief to those convicted as juveniles, illustrating a soft spot
for those convicted under dated and harsh laws when they were mere
children.
Irrespective of its possible motivations, the Court’s willingness to
interfere with the deference given to a state court in a state court
habeas proceeding is a clear departure from its previous decisions.89
This sharp departure from precedent, alone, demands attention from
all courts, as it illustrates the majority favoring protection of
substantive rights over federalism. This cry for attention will likely be
echoed by state court prisoners, who will use Montgomery to correct
their sentences that under today’s substantive laws would be illegal.
Following Montgomery it seems that “locking the door and throwing
away the key” is no more than an overused cliché.

87. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 727 (2016). Here, Montgomery’s case went
straight from the state court’s denial of habeas relief to the Supreme Court of the United States,
bypassing the initial requirement of filing for habeas relief in federal court before reaching the high
court.
88. In its reasoning, the majority stated that new substantive rules of law will apply
retroactively in any proceeding, not just in federal habeas proceedings. Thus, petitioners can now
argue that a new law decided in federal court must be applied retroactively to their state case, so
long as they prove the substantive nature of the new rule. See supra Section IV(A).
89. For example, in Teague the Court ruled on the retroactivity of laws only in federal habeas
proceedings, deciding not to interfere with state court decisions. See supra Part IV.

